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ABSTRACT: In (1959), Carnap famously attacked Heidegger for having constructed an 
insane metaphysics based on a misconception of both the logical form and the semantics 
of ordinary language. In what follows, it will be argued that, once one appropriately 
(i.e., in a Russellian fashion) reads Heidegger’s famous sentence that should paradig-
matically exemplify such a misconception, i.e., “the nothing nothings”, there is nothing 
either logically or semantically wrong with it. The real controversy as to how that sen-
tence has to be evaluated—not as to its meaning but as to its truth—lies at the meta-
physico-ontological level. For in order for the sentence to be true one has to endorse an 
ontology of impossibilia and Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles. 
KEYWORDS: Impossibilia – logical form – metaphysics – nothing – ontology – possibilia – 
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1. Introduction 
 As is well known, in (1959) Rudolph Carnap took some sentences by 
Martin Heidegger (1977) to be representative of typical examples of meta-
physical pseudosentences, i.e., meaningless sentences that are such not only 
because they contain subsentential terms that are meaningless, but also be-
cause, although they are grammatically well-formed, they are logically ill-
formed, i.e., they violate logical form or syntax.  
 The most interesting case discussed by Carnap is a sentence Carnap as-
cribes to Heidegger: 
 (1)  The nothing nothings  
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for it paradigmatically exhibits both flaws.1 According to Carnap, (1) in-
deed is not only meaningless because it contains the meaningless predicate 
“nothings”, but also because from a logical point of view the (quasi-
homophonous) expression “nothing” occurs in it misleadingly. For as re-
gards logical form, this expression is not used in (1) in the only logically 
correct way it may be used; namely, as a quantifier, as it occurs in negative 
existentially quantified sentences of the kind “there is nothing that Fs”, 
“(~∃x)(Fx)”. Rather, it pretends to be used as if it were a singular term. 
Thus, it precisely contributes to yielding a logically ill-formed sentence. 
From Carnap onwards, in some philosophical quarters that sentence or  
a close reformulation of it has become the paradigm of a nonsensical sen-
tence.2
                                                     
1  I say “ascribes” for Heidegger’s real sentence is “the nothing itself nothings” [Das 
Nichts selbst nichtet]. In point of fact, Carnap (1959, 69) includes (1) as the last item in 
a long list of sentences from Heidegger (1977) that for him should be ranked as meta-
physical pseudosentences. Yet the other sentences of the list are less representative than 
(1) in their being metaphysical pseudosentences. For they allegedly exhibit just the first 
kind of flaw—i.e., they allegedly violate logical form only. Moreover, the reason why 
such sentences allegedly violate logical form is for Carnap the same as with (1), i.e., they 
again contain the expression “nothing” (or some cognate expressions) as illogically used. 
Thus, the way out of this ‘no logical form’-charge it will be here provided for (1) also 
applies to these other sentences. 
2  See for instance the way Dennett (1987, 164) makes reference to the sentence 
“Nothing noths”. 
 
 In what follows, it will be argued that Carnap was wrong on both 
counts. That is, it will be first of all claimed not only that (1) may be read 
in a logically correct way, but also that such a way is its suggested reading. 
So, once (1) is appropriately understood, there is no problem with its logical 
form. Moreover, it will be claimed that the predicate “nothings” is definite-
ly meaningful. For the present purposes, this is enough. Yet one may even 
say that, if one endorses certain metaphysico-ontological views about im-
possible denotata and their identity, (1) can turn out to be not only mea-
ningful, but also true. Admittedly, these views are rather controversial, as 
we will see soon below. Yet the controversy on this concern precisely re-
gards metaphysico-ontological preferences, not semantic issues. Carnap’s 
challenge is won if (1) is both logically well-formed and meaningful, re-
gardless of whether it is true. 
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 Before starting, a caveat. The present reconstruction of the situation at 
issue is meant to be theoretical, not historical. First of all, there is no aim 
to show that the present reconstruction of (1) displays what Heidegger had 
in mind in uttering it. Heidegger himself might well have endorsed Car-
nap’s remark that, like any other relevant “nothing”-sentence he mobilizes 
in (1977), (1) lies beyond logic.3
                                                     
3  As Carnap himself underlies, by quoting again Heidegger (1977). Cf. Carnap (1959, 
71). 
 Nevertheless, it may well be the case that 
Carnap failed to grasp Heidegger’s concern with the Nothing in its predi-
cament of what is ruled out by whatever there really is, so that facing such 
a nothingness is what induces anxiety in human beings. Be that as it may, 
(1) will be here considered in abstraction from Heidegger’s real concern 
with it. Rather, we will perform a theoretical exercise in order to check 
whether (1), taken as such, is really illogical and meaningless. Moreover, 
there is no intention to face the historical problem of whether Carnap 
might have found plausible the logico-semantic apparatus that will be here 
mobilized in order to retrieve both logical well-formedness and meaning-
fulness for (1). In conformity with our theoretical exercise, it will rather be 
assumed that Carnap raises a theoretical challenge concerning the very sen-
tence (1) (and its cognates). As such, this challenge goes beyond Carnap’s 
own logico-semantic preferences (involving e.g. his dislike for Russell’s 
theory of descriptions). Once again, the question such a challenge raises is 
the following, rather abstract, one: in itself, is (1) really a logically ill-
formed and meaningless sentence? 
 As a result of this way of putting things, if on behalf of a Heidegger-
oriented philosopher (a certain fictional character: the Heideggerian, for 
short) one can show that, qua paradigmatic case of an alleged metaphysical 
pseudosentence, (1) rather is, once appropriately read, both logically well-
formed and utterly meaningful, the burden of the proof is on a Carnap-
oriented philosopher (another fictional character, although closer than the 
Heideggerean to the real philosopher that inspires it, Carnap himself: the 
Carnapian, for short) to show either that, appearances notwithstanding, 
this is still not the case or that such a reading is either just a mere, rather 
arbitrary, option or anyway irrelevant. 
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2. Logical well-formedness 
 Let me start from the first problem envisaged above. Is it that clear that 
Heidegger’s sentence is meaningless mainly because it is logically ill-
formed? To begin with, suppose the Carnapian claimed that the Heidegge-
rian logically misunderstands a sentence merely beginning with “nothing” 
in a subject-position by committing the Polyphemousian mistake of taking 
that expression as a singular term rather than as a quantifier expression. Yet 
this claim would contain a gross error.4 For note that (1) begins not with 
the mere nominal syntagm “nothing”, but with a definite description con-
taining that syntagm—“the nothing”. In terms at least of its surface gram-
mar, this definite description works as any other such description in which 
a noun is prefixed a definite article (like “the book”, “the dog”, etc.). Given 
this predicament, the Carnapian might well address the Heideggerian with 
a Russellian accusation, namely by charging her to have misleadingly 
equated (1)’s grammatical form, a subject-predicate form, with its logical 
form, where that definite description is eliminated away.5
 Curiously enough (for what counts: see the Introduction’s end), Carnap 
himself seems not very far from committing the above gross error. For on 
the one hand, he rightly reports Heidegger’s dictum as (1), hence as starting 
with “the nothing” rather than with “nothing”. Yet on the other hand, he 
addresses Heidegger with the joint accusation of both having produced  
a logically ill-formed sentence and having mistakenly maintained that “the 
nothing” works in it as a singular term, in such a way that the logical form 
of (1) coincides with its grammatical form, a subject-predicate form: 
“No(no)”, as Carnap himself writes.
 Yet the Carna-
pian cannot charge the Heideggerian with the accusation of having pro-
duced a sentence that is logically ill-formed for it illogically mispresents  
a quantifier as a singular term.  
6
                                                     
4  As is well known, in the Odissey Ulysses leads the cyclop Polyphemus astray by let-
ting him mean “Nobody blinded me” as a sentence containing “nobody” as a proper 
name and so forcing him to be misunderstood by his fellows, who correctly take “no-
body” as a quantifier. 
5  Cf. Russell (1905a). As we will immediately see, however, it would be wrong to ad-
dress the Heideggerian with this accusation. Instead, one may say that perhaps Meinong 
(1960), or rather the early Russell (see later), implicitly conceived “the nothing” as  
a singular term such that (1)’s logical form is its grammatical subject-predicate form.  
6  Cf. Carnap (1959, 70). 
 Yet those two things cannot stand to-
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gether. One such joint accusation would be correct only if (1) merely con-
tained the nominal syntagm “nothing”, not the definite description “the 
nothing”. But since (1) contains “the nothing”, the only accusation that 
Carnap might have addressed to Heidegger is that he mistook (1)’s logical 
form by equating it with its grammatical form,7 but not that (1) has no 
logical form at all.8
 To begin with, on behalf of the Heideggerian suppose first that the de-
finite description “the nothing” fits a Russellian account of definite descrip-
tions, as any other such description. Second, suppose that the predicative 
element of that description expresses the property of being identical with 
nothing, or in other terms, of being a thing such that there is no thing that is 
identical with that thing—λx((~∃y)(y = x)). If this is the case, insofar as it 
figures in that description, “nothing” really serves a quantifying purpose. 
 
 The above observations can be pursued a bit further. Once the Heideg-
gerian positively endorses that a definite description occurs in subject-
position in (1), she can first of all show that no logical ill-formedness oc-
curs in (1). Moreover, by reconstructing (1)’s proper logical form, she can 
positively account for the idea that (1) contains an expression in subject-
position that can logically function only insofar as it serves a quantifying 
purpose. Since this was the idea lurking behind Carnap’s main reason for 
rejecting (1)’s well-formedness, the Heideggerian may well expect that the 
Carnapian charge that (1) is logically ill-formed is adequately countered. 
Let us see.  
                                                     
7  That Carnap well acknowledges to (1): cf. Carnap (1959, 69). 
8  While reading (1959), it repeatedly seems as if Carnap saw no difference in the fact 
that the relevant sentence merely contains “nothing” or “the nothing” in subject posi-
tion. Few paragraphs later, Carnap says that the sentence “the nothing exists” would be 
meaningless even if it were logically correct that “nothing” in it worked as a singular 
term (my italics). For that sentence would simultaneously ascribe existence and non-
existence to the entity allegedly denoted by the relevant singular term. As we will see 
later (cf. fn. 14), once (1) is appropriately understood, there is no problem in yielding 
“the nothing exists” an appropriate reading as well. Independently of this, however, 
Carnap was perhaps misled by the fact that Heidegger often capitalizes “nothing” (as we 
have seen, the German original for (1) is “Das Nichts (selbst) nichtet”); as if Carnap’s 
opponent already considered “nothing” taken in isolation as a singular term, so that pre-
fixing it by the definite article were for him simply a way to stress again that considera-
tion. (In point of fact, we will later see that whenever a proper name “N” is prefixed by  
a definite article so as to get the nominal description “the N”, its semantic value 
changes. But let us put this aside.) 
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Yet this is not the purpose “nothing” fulfils when it occurs alone as  
a nominal syntagm in any sentence of the kind “nothing Fs”, namely, the 
purpose of letting that sentence say that there is no thing that instantiates 
the property expressed by the predicate “F”. Rather, the quantifying pur-
pose in (1) shows itself in the fact that the predicate in terms of which the 
description “the nothing” is Russelleanly analyzed contains a negated exis-
tential quantifier, so as to express the property of being a thing such, that 
there is no thing that is identical with that thing. So, when that description 
is analysed à la Russell, (1) turns out to be equivalent with: 
 (1R) What is identical with nothing nothings. 
This formally becomes: 
 (1FR) (∃x)((~∃y)(y=x) ∧ (∀z)((~∃y)(y=z) → (z=x)) ∧ Nx) 
where the quantifying purpose served by “nothing” is given by the second 
existential quantifier—“∃y”—in the formalized sentence, the quantifier 
contained in the predicate by means of which the definite description “the 
nothing” is eliminated away. Now, once (1) is analyzed as (1FR), no mis-
take in logical form arises. Thus, Carnap’s first claim that Heidegger’s sen-
tence is logically ill-formed appears to be ungrounded. 
 The Carnapian might here wonder why, even if she acknowledges that 
(1) contains the definite description “the nothing” rather than the mere 
nominal syntagm “nothing”, she has to read that description as “the thing 
that is identical with nothing” and then to take (1) as equivalent with (1R), 
hence with (1FR). More explicitly, the Carnapian might reply as follows. 
Let us concede that (1) may be read as (1FR). The problem is, why should 
it be read as such. Although superficially “nothing” is a noun, logically 
speaking it expresses a quantifier. So, the alleged description “the nothing” 
is logically ill-formed. For it impossibly tries to form a nominal syntagm, 
“the nothing”, to be accordingly analyzed à la Russell, out of a quantifier, 
“nothing”, i.e., a second-order predicate, rather than out of a genuine 
noun, which in Russell’s analysis disappears in favour (inter alia) of a first-
order predicate. 
 Yet reading (1) as (1FR) is definitely not an ad hoc move. First of all, we 
may expect that the account here given for “the nothing” generalizes to 
other similar cases of definite descriptions involving quantifying expres-
sions. Which is precisely the case. Consider the description “the some-
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thing”. Its quantifying purpose may well be accounted for by taking it as  
a shorthand for “the thing that is identical with something”. Thus: 
 (2)  The something somethings 
may well be read as: 
 (2R) What is identical with something somethings 
hence formally as: 
 (2FR) (∃x)((∃y)(y=x) ∧ (∀z)((∃y)(y=z) → (z=x)) ∧ Sx). 
Moreover, the Carnapian should provide a justification for the thesis she 
implicitly assumes in her reply that an expression’s contribution to the log-
ical form of sentence in which it figures remains always the same, regardless 
of the syntactic position in which it occurs. For such a thesis grounds her 
claim that in the (for her logically ill-formed) description “the nothing”, 
“nothing” works as a quantifier, as in any sentence of the form “Nothing  
F-s”. Yet there are many cases in which an expression’s contribution to the 
logical form of the sentence in which it figures changes according to its 
syntactic position in such a sentence. 
 Consider a proper name “N”. If friends of direct reference are correct, 
whenever it occurs in subject position, “N”’s contribution to the logical 
form of the sentence in which so figures is that of an individual constant. 
Yet when the definite article is prefixed to “N” so as to yield the definite 
description “the N”, the name does not logically work as an individual con-
stant, but as a predicate, typically expressing the property of being called ‘N’. 
So, if we form a definite description by prefixing the definite article to  
a proper name, say, if we take “Obama” and by prefixing to it the definite 
article we get the definite description “the Obama”, once we insert that de-
scription in a sentence it is not simply the case that we may read that de-
scription as a shorthand for “the individual who is called ‘Obama’”. Rather, 
this is its most plausible reading.9
                                                     
9  Some say that one such description is what the corresponding proper name abbre-
viates. Yet there will be here no attempt at checking whether the so-called nominal de-
scription theory of proper names (cf. e.g. Bach 1987) is the correct semantic account of 
such expressions. 
 Mutatis mutandis, therefore, the same 
will hold for any sentence containing the description “the nothing”. 
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 At this point, absent a problem with (1)’s logical form, the Heideggerian 
can even wonder whether that description, contextually defined à la Russell, 
has a Russellian denotation, i.e., an entity that uniquely satisfies it. Surpri-
singly enough, the answer is far from being straightforwardly negative.  
 First, the existential import of (1R) may well be satisfied, once one un-
derstands the existential quantifier in a non-existentially loaded way, that 
is, as a mere particular quantifier. As many have stressed, in order for  
a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions to work, one does not have to 
require the existential quantifier involved in that analysis to range over 
things that exist in a substantial sense.10 By “substantial sense” one here 
means that the existence involved here is a property that makes a difference 
for the individuals having it. As many people believing in such a property 
claim, this property is a non-universal first-order property, i.e., a property 
that, like any other genuine first-order property, divides the overall domain 
of what there is into entities that have it and entities that fail to have it.11 
Now, in Russell’s account, to say that there is something that Fs merely 
means that the property of being F is instantiated. This says nothing as to 
whether in order for that property to be instantiated, whatever instantiates it 
must exist in a substantial sense—that is, whether the property must be an 
existence-entailing property, in the terminology inaugurated by Cocchiarella 
(1982). Now, this is the case precisely as regards the property of being identical 
with nothing. In order for this property to be instantiated, whatever instan-
tiates it does not have to exist in any substantial sense. Thus, once one ac-
cepts an ontology that allows for things that do not exist in a substantial 
sense, it may well turn out that the existential import of (1R) is satisfied.12
 Second, one may argue that the uniqueness import of (1R) is also satis-
fied. For suppose that there were more than one entity that had the property 
of being identical with nothing; that is, suppose that the property 
λx((~∃y)(y=x)) had multiple instances. Suppose further that such a prop-
erty were the only property that qualifies such entities—the other features 
  
                                                     
10  As we will see soon below, Kaplan (2005) is one of the late supporters of this exis-
tential neutrality of Russell’s theory of descriptions. 
11  For this substantial sense of existence, cf. e.g. McGinn (2000). Substantial existence 
is what Williamson (2002) labels “existence in physical sense”. If one rather sympathizes 
with Meinong (1960), this is the property of having direct or indirect causal powers. 
12  Many people have claimed that identity properties are not existence-entailing prop-
erties: cf. again McGinn (2000), Williamson (1990). 
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allegedly qualifying them merely amounting to mere different descriptions 
that make no real difference between such entities. This indeed is a plausi-
ble supposition, for it is hard to see how entities that differ from every-
thing, themselves included, may have other properties.13
 Granted, in order for this argument to be really convincing, one has to 
endorse a Leibnizian principle of the identity of the indiscernibles. In other 
terms, one has to assume that for any property F, if entity x has it iff entity 
y has it, then x and y are the very same entity. Given that (apart from self-
identity: see soon later) being identical with nothing is the only property such 
alleged entities possess, then Leibniz’s principle indeed forces such entities 
to be the same thing. Now, it is well known that Leibniz’s principle is con-
troversial: why couldn’t x and y share all their properties and nevertheless 
be two numerically distinct things? Be that as it may, if both the existential 
and the uniqueness import of (1R) were satisfied, it would turn out that 
the description “the nothing” has a Russellian denotation.
 If this were the 
case, those entities would no longer be distinct. How many entities can 
there be that differ from everything, themselves included, if this is the only 
property that allegedly qualifies such entities? 
14
 To begin with, in order for the property of being identical with nothing 
to be uniquely instantiated viz. for that description to have a Russellian de-
notation, that denotation must be an impossible entity. For in order for that 
property to be (uniquely) instantiated, even assuming a broad domain of 
possibilia is not enough. Any merely possible entity, that is, any entity 
which does not substantially exist but which might have done so, does not 
instantiate the property of being identical with nothing. For it will instead in-
stantiate the opposite property of being identical with something—
 
 For the present purposes, however, one can remain neutral not only on 
whether that argument is convincing, so that the uniqueness import of 
(1FR) is satisfied, but also on whether the existential import of (1FR) is sa-
tisfied, so that “the nothing” denotes.  
                                                     
13  Apart, as we will immediately see, the property of being identical with something. 
Consider e.g. the description “the nothing that I like”. As many claim, since this de-
scription involves the intentional predicate “to like”, the fact that one applies this de-
scription to x yet fails to apply it to y does not entail that x is not y. 
14  As a result, far from being meaningless because of its contradictoriety as Carnap 
claims (cf. fn. 8), the further Heideggerian sentence “the nothing exists” turns out to be 
true, once meaning “There is [in an existentially unloaded way] only one thing that is 
identical with nothing”. 
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λx((∃y)(y=x)). The merely possible offspring of (a certain sperm of) Brad 
Pitt and (a certain egg of) Penelope Cruz, for instance, who does not sub-
stantially exist but might have done so, is not such that there is nothing 
that is identical with him; trivially, he is identical with himself. Yet consid-
er now impossible entities, that is, entities that not only fail to substantially 
exist but also could not have done so. Well, only an impossibile can instan-
tiate the property of being identical with nothing. For one such entity will be 
something that is made impossible precisely by the fact that it instantiates 
not only the property of being identical with nothing, but also, like any other 
entity whatsoever, the property of being identical with something. 
 As stated before, this is not such a big problem for the Heideggerian 
once she accepts a non-existentially loaded reading of the particular quan-
tifier, or in other terms, once she accepts that the overall domain of what 
there is also contains entities that do not exist in a substantial sense. Yet 
the Heideggerian has to face a more serious problem. If the alleged imposs-
ible denotation of the description “the nothing” also instantiates, like any 
other entity, the property of being identical with something, then it is not the 
case that it instantiates the property of being identical with nothing. For if 
our entity is identical with something, then in point of fact it is not the 
case that there is nothing it is identical with! Or, if you like, it is true both 
that such a thing is such that nothing is identical with it and that such  
a thing is such that something (namely, that very thing) is identical with it. 
So, how can one say that “the nothing” has a denotation, let alone an im-
possible one, if the existential import of the Russellian paraphrase involving 
the description is far from being satisfied, or if you like, it is both satisfied 
and not satisfied? 
 As one may easily see, this critique is reminiscent of Russell’s famous 
criticism against Meinong to the effect that Meinongian nonexistent ob-
jects are to be ruled out of the overall ontological domain insofar as they 
violate the Law of Non-contradiction. Consider two paradigmatic examples 
of such objects, namely the square that is not a square and the existent 
present king of France. The former is such that it is both the case that it is  
a square and that it is not a square. The latter is such that it is both the 
case that it exists and that it does not exist. As they violate the Law of 
Non-contradiction, they are no genuine entities.15
                                                     
15  Cf. Russell (1905a,b). As is well known, Russell’s original example involved the case 
of the round square. Yet in order to avoid the problem of whether the fact that the 
 So according to the cri-
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tique in question, the same holds of the thing that is such that both it is 
the case that nothing is identical with it and it is not the case that nothing 
is identical with it. For something is identical with it, namely itself. 
 As said before, there is here no particular interest in holding that “the 
nothing” has a denotation. On behalf of the Heideggerian, one merely has 
to stick to the idea that sentences containing that description, like (1), are 
logically well-formed. Yet the problem the above critique arises may be 
successfully dealt with by slightly amending the Russellian account of (1) 
put forward before. This amendment can be endorsed by a Heideggerian 
who adopts the usual device Meinongians use to dispense with Russell’s 
criticism: an impossible entity is ontologically contradictory—for some pair 
of property P and its complement non-P, it possesses both—but it is not 
propositionally contradictory—it does not involve that both a sentence “p” 
and its negation “~p” are true. Let us see.16
 Like Russell’s criticism to Meinong, the above critique presupposes, as 
we have done here all along, that the negation involved in mobilizing the 
expression “being identical with nothing” is propositional and not predica-
tive: that is, it attaches to sentences rather than to predicates. Yet, as Mei-
nongians do to Russell, the Heideggerian may well respond to the above 
critique that, as far as impossible objects are concerned, the negation there 
involved is the predicative and not the propositional one. So, Meinongians 
say, the square that is not a square is not something such that it is both the 
case that it is a square and that it is not a square. Rather, it is something 
that is both a square and a non-square. Analogously, the Heideggerian may 
say, “the nothing” still has an impossible denotation. For it is not the case 
both that nothing is identical with such a denotation and that something is 
identical with it (i.e., it is not the case that nothing is identical with it). 
Rather, that denotation is something that is both identical with something 
and non-(identical with something), i.e., non-identical with everything. In 
this respect, like any impossibile for Meinong, the impossible denotation of 
“the nothing” violates the objectual version of the Law of Non-contra-
  
                                                     
round square contains incompatible determinations really makes it a contradictory ob-
ject, Russell’s example is reformulated in terms of a case of a Meinongian object that re-
ally is in some sense (as we will see immediately below, an objectual rather than a prop-
ositional one) a contradictory object. For this common policy, cf. e.g. Thrush (2001, 
160). 
16  For this Meinongian move cf. e.g. Simons (1990). 
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diction—for any property P and its complement non-P, an object cannot 
have both—but not the propositional version of that Law—for any sentence 
“p” and its negation “~p”, both cannot be true, as the Russell-like critique 
instead presupposes. In other terms, the description “the nothing” may still 
denote an object, let alone an impossible one. For such an entity is imposs-
ible not because it is both the case that nothing is identical with it and that 
something is identical with it, but merely because it has both a property—
being identical with something, λx((∃y)(y=x))—and its complement—being 
non-(identical with something), i.e., being non-identical with everything, 
λx((∀y)(y≠x)). 
 This response requires some adjustments in what the description “the 
nothing” is a shorthand for, hence in the Russellian paraphrase of (1). Once 
it is read à la Russell, the description “the nothing” has to mean the same 
as “the thing that is non-identical with everything” instead of “the thing 
that is such that it is not the case that something is identical with it”. In 
other terms, in the relevant predicate that contributes to eliminate away 
the description, the negation is not attached to an existential quantifier, as 
it has been supposed with the Heideggerian all along—“(~∃y)”—but rather 
to the sub-predicate “identical to something”, “(∃y)(x=y)”, so as to gener-
ate the complementary predicate “non-(identical to something)”, i.e., “non-
identical to everything”, “(∀y)(y≠x)”. Thus, the quantifying import of 
“nothing” in that description turns out to be ascribed to a universal quan-
tifier—“(∀y)”. Putting all this together, for the Heideggerian that adopts 
the Meinongian distinction between predicative and propositional negation 
(1R) comes out true when read not as (1FR), but rather as: 
 (1FRMH) (∃x)((∀y)(y≠x) ∧ (∀z)((∀y)(y≠z) → (z=x)) ∧ Nx). 
For according to such a Meinongianized Heideggerian there is just one 
thing that is non-identical with everything, a thing which is objectually im-
possible for it is also identical with something, and that thing nothings. 
 Granted, even once the Meinongian distinction is adopted, not only en-
dorsing the Leibnizian principle of the identity of the indiscernibles, but 
also allowing for impossibilia so as to get a Russellian denotatum for a de-
scription such as “the nothing” is hard to swallow. But, to stress the point 
once again, the problem now is no longer logical, let alone semantic; it is 
purely metaphysico-ontological. For the purposes of logical form, to read 
(1) as (1FRMH) is enough. Remember that the challenge against the Hei-
deggerian is to show that (1) is both logically well-formed and meaningful, 
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not to show that it is true—for which, a necessary condition is that “the 
nothing” has a Russellian denotation. Yet if on the behalf of the Heidegge-
rian one has an ontological argument in favour of impossibilia—as some 
claim they have17
 Once again, let us put aside what the real Heidegger had in mind. Yet 
first of all, if in this concern by “genuine singular term” the Carnapian 
—then there is no reason not to admit impossibilia into 
the overall domain of what there is. If moreover on the same behalf one al-
so endorses the Leibnizian principle, there is no reason not to admit an im-
possibile to be the unique instantiator of the property of being non-identical 
with everything, hence to be the denotation of the description “the noth-
ing”. As David Kaplan magistrally claimed: 
In fact, although Russell’s theory of descriptions is often described as  
a model for avoiding ontological commitments, it is essentially neutral 
with respect to ontological commitment. This, I think, is one of its vir-
tues. Meinong believed that there is a nonexistent object that is both 
round and square. Russell didn’t. This is an ontological dispute. If 
Meinong is right, and nothing else is round and square, then the defi-
nite description ‘the round square’ denotes, and there is no way of using 
Russell’s theory of descriptions to remove this object from the ontolo-
gy. If Meinong is wrong, then the definite description doesn’t denote, 
and that’s the end of it. (Kaplan 2005, 975-976) 
 At this point, the Carnapian may try to launch a final attack against the 
Heideggerian with respect to (1)’s logicality. Let us concede, she might say, 
that Heidegger did not commit the Polyphemousian error of mistaking  
a quantifying expression—“nothing”—for a singular term. Yet, the Carna-
pian might go on saying, even if Heidegger deliberately mobilized a definite 
description—“the nothing”—this does not mean that the Heideggerian 
reading of it conforms to Russell’s theory of descriptions. For what counts, 
Heidegger quite likely meant “the nothing” as a genuine singular term. But 
if the Heideggerian maintained that “the nothing” is a genuine singular 
term, then a logical mistake can still be ascribed to her with respect to (1); 
namely, the logical mistake Russell ascribed to anyone taking (1)’s subject-
predicate grammatical form to be identical with its logical form. 
                                                     
17  Cf. for instance Priest (2005), Iacona (2007). 
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means a Fregean singular term,18
 Moreover, suppose that by “genuine singular term” the Carnapian in-
stead means a directly referential device, i.e., a term that extinguishes its 
truth-conditional contribution in its referent—as logically proper names 
were for Russell and the early Wittgenstein, and proper names in general 
are for contemporary sustainers of the post-Kripkean new theory of refer-
ence.
 the accusation bounces back against the 
Carnapian herself. Suppose that “the nothing” is a definite description and 
moreover that a definite description, as Frege (1980) wanted, has not to be 
eliminated away à la Russell, for it logically is a singular term as much as  
a proper name. But then, not only “the nothing” turns out to be a genuine 
singular term, but also (1) is logically perfect. For its logical form turns out 
to be a subject-predicate form, as Frege claimed for any sentence contain-
ing a definite description in subject-position. 
19 But then to accuse the Heideggerian of mistaking that definite de-
scription for a genuine singular term is rather unfair. If somebody must be 
charged with this accusation, this precisely is Russell himself: not the 1905 
Russell of the theory of descriptions, but the 1903 Russell of the Principles 
of Mathematics. At that time, Russell explicitly took the expression “noth-
ing” as directly referring20 to a certain denoting concept, [NOTHING].21
                                                     
18  As a loyal Carnapian should do, given Carnap’s (1949) intention of precisifying 
Frege’s semantics. In point of fact, it would be very strange that a loyal Carnapian ad-
dressed this criticism to the Heideggerian. 
19  To be sure, a loyal Carnapian could not take a genuine singular term as a directly 
referential device; she should take it in a way that does not distinguish between proper 
names and rigid definite descriptions, namely, as a singular term having qua its inten-
sion a constant function from possible worlds to individuals. But let us put this compli-
cation aside. 
20  As is well known, Russell tends to use the term “to indicate” in order to speak of 
the relation between an expression and its denoting concept (1903, §51). Yet this is the 
same term he uses to speak of the standing-for relation that holds between a name and 
its designatum. Thus, following Salmon (2005) the indication relation may well be taken 
as a relation of direct reference between the expression and the item it indicates. 
 
21  Cf. Russell (1903, §73). Curiously enough, in that very complicated paragraph of 
the book Russell puts forward the apparently contradictory theses that i) unlike most 
denoting concepts, the denoting concept [NOTHING] has no denotation and ii) that de-
noting concept is not nothing, i.e., it is not identical with its denotation (literally, it is 
not what itself denotes: for Russell, this is what the sentence “Nothing is not nothing”, 
or better the proposition that sentence signifies, means). That tension may be removed 
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Thus, one may well take (that) Russell also to hold that the definite de-
scription “the nothing”, like any other definite description, directly refers 
to another denoting concept, one having uniqueness embedded in it: a de-
terminative denoting concept, [THE [NOTHING]].22 That is, pretty much as 
for the 1903 Russell the definite description “the present Queen of Eng-
land” directly refers to the determinative denoting concept [THE [PRESENT 
& QUEEN_OF_ENGLAND]], while the definite description “the present King 
of France” directly refers to the determinative denoting concept [THE 
[PRESENT & KING_OF_FRANCE]], so according to that Russell the descrip-
tion “the nothing” has to directly refer to the determinative denoting con-
cept [THE [NOTHING]]—whatever that concept really amounts to.23
 Now, if reading “the nothing” as a directly referential term entails en-
dorsing the 1903 Russell’s theory of denoting concepts, then the Heidegge-
rian may well say that she declines to endorse that theory for the well 
known problems it raises in general—that is, also with respect to ‘ordinary’ 
determinative denoting concepts such as the two above [THE [PRESENT & 
QUEEN_OF_ENGLAND]] and [THE [PRESENT & KING_OF_FRANCE]].
  
24
                                                     
if one takes i) and ii) as respectively saying that such a denoting concept has no possible 
denotation and that such a concept does not coincide with its impossible denotation. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same would hold of the determinative denoting concept [THE 
[NOTHING]] that “the nothing” indicates. So, one may tentatively conclude that Russell 
at least adumbrated the idea, which I have hitherto reformulated in the context of his 
later theory of definite descriptions, according to which if the description “the nothing” 
had a denotation, it would be an impossible one. 
22  The phrase “determinative denoting concept” comes from Orilia (2006, 195). See 
again Orilia (2003) for the notational convention I use in order to speak of denoting 
concepts. 
23  Of course, this denoting concept does not come out as an absurd application of the 
import of the definite article to the denoting concept indicated by “nothing”. Rather, 
that concept is something the description “the nothing” elliptically indicates. Pretty 
much as the denoting concept indicated by a description of the kind “the N.N.”, where 
“N.N.” stands for a proper name, which would be something like [THE 
[CALLED_‘N.N.’]]. 
24  For the purposes of this paper, the well known controversy on whether Russell 
(1905a) criticism of his own previous theory of denoting concepts is sound may be set 
apart. For that theory has the preliminary problem that, appearances notwithstanding, it 
prevents one from speaking of the denotation of a denoting concept by using a descrip-
tion that directly refers to that concept. 
 As 
a result, the Heideggerian may well be inclined to espouse Russell’s later 
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theory of descriptions. Which is precisely what the Heideggerian has been 
ascribed here all along, by supplying her with a reading of (1) as (1R) taken 
as (1FR), or better, in terms of the previous adjustment, as (1FRHM). 
3. Meaningfulness 
 At this point, the Carnapian may put forward again his second claim 
against (1). That is, she may remark that in order for (1) to be true, it is 
not enough to allow the description “the nothing” to have a denotation, it 
must also be the case that such a denotation satisfies the predicate “noth-
ings” contained in the sentence. But this can hardly be the case, for that 
predicate means nothing! Which was the second, admittedly weaker, rea-
son, to deny (1) meaningfulness (the first reason being its alleged violation 
of logical form). 
 Apparently, the Heideggerian may have an easy reply here. It is rather 
curious that the same philosophical quarters that deny meaningfulness to 
an apparently ad hoc predicate such as “nothings” have admitted meaning-
fulness to clearly ad hoc predicates like “pegasizes”, or even “carnapizes” and 
“heideggerizes”, which have been invoked to yield a systematic descriptivist 
theory of proper names. As is well known, Quine (1961) assumed that  
a proper name “N.N.” is synonymous with the description “the N.N.-izer”, 
i.e., “the thing that N.N.-izes”. Once such a description is available, one 
can form a sentence out of it in which the predicate explicitly contained in 
the Russellian paraphrase of such a sentence that ‘eliminates away’ that de-
scription also figures with the same interpretation in the properly predica-
tive part of the sentence, as follows: 
 (3)  The N.N.-izer N.N.-izes 
   (∃x)(Nx ∧ ((∀y)(Ny → y=x) ∧ Nx) 
So why not allow for the meaningfulness of a predicate such as “nothings” 
along the same line or similar ones?  
 Yet it would be wiser for the Heideggerian to reject this easy reply. First 
of all, as we have seen the Heideggerian never commits to the Polyphem-
ousian idea that “nothing” works as a proper name in (1), so it would be 
odd for her to construe a predicate such as “nothings” out of a proper 
name, as “pegasizes” and the other infamous predicates are. Second, as  
far as I know, there can be only one reasonable non question-begging in-
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terpretation of all the predicates of the same kind as “to N.N.-ize”,25 ac-
cording to which those predicates respectively express certain monadic prop-
erties of the individuals they are truly predicated of; typically, monadic indi-
vidual essences, i.e., non-relational properties those individuals uniquely 
and necessarily possess.26 In this vein, the Heideggerian might say that the 
predicate “nothings” expresses a monadic individual essence of the thing 
the description “the nothing” denotes. Yet this would amount to explain 
obscura by obscuriora. There are many doubts as to what an individual es-
sence in general is, that is, also as regards bona fide individuals like Carnap 
and Heidegger, Meinong and Russell, let alone a monadic individual es-
sence.27
                                                     
25  For a criticism to an interpretation reading a predicate of the kind “N.N.-izes” as 
“being identical with N.N.”, which obviously does not explain away the name “N.N.” 
Quine intended to get rid of, cf. Leonardi and Napoli (1995). 
26  Notoriously, Kaplan (1975, 722-3) proposed haecceities as relational individual es-
sences like the property of being identical with O such that a certain object O is its only 
possible possessor. One such property however presupposes that we already have its 
unique instantiator at our disposal. 
27  The only plausible candidates for individual essences are relational non question-
begging properties like world-indexed individual properties (cf. Plantinga 1974), or ac-
tualia-dependent individual properties (cf. Rosenkrantz 1984). 
 To grasp what is a monadic individual essence of an impossible 
entity is definitely an even harder enterprise. 
 As a matter of fact, the Heideggerian has an alternative and more plaus-
ible reply at her disposal. Once the description “the nothing” is taken to 
mean the same as “the thing that is non-identical with everything”, the 
predicate “nothings” may be analogously paraphrased as “is non-identical 
with everything”, which is formally to be read as: “x is such that every y is 
non-identical with it”. In other terms, (1FRHM) may be further analyzed as: 
 (1FRHM′) (∃x)((∀y)(y≠x) ∧ (∀z)((∀y)(y≠z) → (z=x)) ∧ (∀y)(y≠x)). 
So, the whole sentence may be read as saying that the only thing that is 
such that everything is non-identical with it is also such that everything is 
non-identical with it. 
 In point of fact, this is the most plausible interpretation of the predicate 
“nothings”. An (admittedly colloquial) way of rephrasing Heidegger’s sen-
tence is: 
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 (1′) The nothing is a nothing 
whose surface grammar is of the form “The F is an F”. As any sentence of 
this form requires that the very same predicate with the same interpreta-
tion occurs throughout it, this is the case with (1′), hence with (1). 
 In terms of the (admittedly controversial) hypothesis that “the nothing” 
denotes, this move yields a statement that is not only logically well-formed 
and meaningful, but also true. Granted, that truth is rather trivial—as 
when one says that the zip inventor is a zip inventor. Yet the Heideggerian 
may also read (1FRHM′) in a more interesting way, by treating the last oc-
currence of the universal quantifier “(∀y)” occurring in it as contextually re-
stricted to the mere subdomain of possibilia. By means of this adjustment, 
the sentence would say that the only thing that is such that everything is 
non-identical with it, is also such that everything possible is non-identical 
with it. Incidentally, it is likely that such a reading would be welcome to a 
Heideggerian that insisted, in a very Heideggerian way, that what one talks 
about via “the nothing” is not a res, it is beyond the realm of the Seiende. In 
this reading, in fact, that insistence would not be a Heideggerian clumsi-
ness. For it would express something rather clear: insofar as the thing that 
is non-identical with everything is no possible thing, it evaporates from the 
only reality that counts—the subdomain of possibilia—it nullifies itself. 
The nothing itself nihilates, as Heidegger’s dictum is nowadays alternatively 
translated.28
 To sum up. If what has been said here is right, then “the nothing 
nothings” is, pace Carnap, neither logically ill-formed nor anyway meaning-
less because of the meaninglessness of some of its subsentential compo-
nents, notably its predicate expression. It may also turn out that the de-
scription “the nothing”, once it is supplied with a Russellian account, has  
a Russellian denotation, provided i) one accepts a Meinongian distinction 
between predicative and propositional negation and moreover ii) she en-
dorses the richest possible ontology one may conceive of, i.e., an ontology 
also of impossibilia, as well as iii) Leibniz’s metaphysical principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles. But while appealing to i)–iii) goes toward show-
 
                                                     
28  Cf. Heidegger (1977). 
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ing that (1) is true, it is not essential in order for Heidegger’s vituperated 
sentence to regain a highly respectable status.29
                                                     
29  Let us thank Francesco Berto, Andrea Iacona, Fred Kroon, Francesco Orilia, and 
Elisa Paganini for various important comments to previous versions of this paper. 
 
References 
BACH, K. (1987): Thought and Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
CARNAP, R. (1949): Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
CARNAP, R. (1959): The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Lan-
guage. In: Ayer, A.J. (ed.): Logical Positivism. (Transl. from the 1932 German origi-
nal by A. Pap.) Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 60-81. 
COCCHIARELLA, N.B. (1982): Meinong Reconstructed Versus Early Russell Recon-
structed. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11, 183-214. 
DENNETT, D. (1987): The Intentional Stance. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
FREGE, G. (1980): On Sense and Denotation. In: Geach, P.T. – Black, M. (eds.): 
Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. (Transl. from the 1892 
German original by M. Black.) Oxford: Blackwell, 56-78. 
HEIDEGGER, M. (1977): What is Metaphysics? In: Basic Writings. (Transl. from the 
1929 German original by D.F. Krell.) New York: Harper & Row, 89-110. 
IACONA, A. (2007): Not Everything is Possible. Logic Journal of IGPL 15, 233-237. 
KAPLAN, D. (1975): How to Russell a Frege-Church. The Journal of Philosophy 72, 716-
729. 
KAPLAN, D. (2005): Reading ‘On Denoting’ on its Centenary. Mind 114, 933-1003. 
LEONARDI, P. – NAPOLI, E. (1995). On Naming. In: Leonardi, P. – Santambrogio, M. 
(eds.): On Quine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 251-266. 
MCGINN, C. (2000): Logical Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
MEINONG, A. (1960): On the Theory of Objects. In: Chisholm, R. (ed.): Realism and 
the Background of Phenomenology. (Transl. from the 1904 German original by I. Le-
vi, D.B. Terrell, and R.M. Chisholm.) New York: Free Press, 76-117. 
ORILIA, F. (2003): A Description Theory of Singular Reference. Dialectica 57, 7-40. 
ORILIA, F. (2006): Identity across Time and Stories. In: Bottani, A. – Davies, R. (eds.): 
Modes of Existence. Munich: Ontos Verlag, 191-220. 
PLANTINGA, A. (1974): The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
PRIEST, G. (2005): Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press. 
QUINE, W.V.O. (1961): On What There Is. In: From a Logical Point of View. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1-19. 
ROSENKRANTZ, G. (1984): Nonexistent Possibles and Their Individuation. Grazer Phi-
losophische Studien 22, 127-147. 
38  A L B E R T O  V O L T O L I N I   
RUSSELL, B. (1903): The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.  
RUSSELL, B. (1905a). On Denoting. Mind 14, 473-493. 
RUSSELL, B. (1905b): Critical Notice of: A. Meinong, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstand-
theorie und Psychologie. Mind 14, 530-538. 
SALMON, N. (2005): On Designating. Mind 114, 1069-1133. 
SIMONS, P. (1990): On What There Isn’t: The Meinong-Russell Dispute. In: Philosophy 
and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 159-181. 
THRUSH, M. (2001): Do Meinong’s Impossible Objects Entail Contradictions? Grazer 
Philosophische Studien 62, 157-173. 
WILLIAMSON T, (1990): Necessary Identity and Necessary Existence. In: Haller, R. – 
Brandl, J. (eds.): Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-Evaluation I. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-
Tempsky, 168-175. 
WILLIAMSON, T (2002): Necessary Existents. In: O’Hear, A. (ed.): Logic, Thought and 
Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 233-251. 
